Exclusive Interview
with Dr. Ervand Abrahamian
Professor of History at
Baruch College, New York; Advisor to the Campaign in Solidarity with the
Iranian People’s Green Movement
Date of Interview:
Thank you for
giving us the opportunity to have this interview with you. Before anything
else, please give us an overview of the impact of sanctions on the current
economic situation in
The economic situation is
really serious because of the decline in the value of the rial.
And that is partly caused by sanctions, but not wholly. The sanctions have
aggravated the situation; they have been the final straw on it. Pressure on the
rial has been there for quite a while for a number of
reasons. One, the rial has always been artificially a
bit high because the government has tried to bolster it. Secondly, there has
been inflation because of the printing and distribution of money, and the way Ahmadinejad has been spending money during the last eight
years. That has been a long-going process, and of course people in the Central
Bank have been warning about the dangers of it and the inflation.
On top of all that, of
course, has now come the sanctions and the feeling in the markets that the
government does not have that much reserves. The government has been very
secretive about how much reserve it has. It probably has more reserves than
people think it has. But the fact that the government has introduced two types
of exchange rate — one, the official, more favorable
exchange rate for priority goods, for importing such things as food and
essential commodities; and another rate for less essential goods with drastic
cutting of the ability to get dollars for things like student scholarships and
so on — has added to the general feeling among the public and the markets that
the government does not have much on reserve. So, people have been trying to
buy anything except for rial. Money has been going
into buying gold. Generally, then, people have been trying to avoid having rials. And that has been the main reason for the summersaulting decline of the rial
during the past three weeks.
There is not much the
government can do to establish confidence short of hoping that sanctions will
not go further and that Iran will be able to sell oil and get the revenue to
support the fundamentals of the economy.
How is the
government handling this economic pressure? Is it just transferring the
economic pressure on to the public, or is it trying to avoid that? It seems
that the former is happening.
I think the government is
basically thinking in terms of almost a war economy. If the sanctions continue
then they need to have enough money to buy essential goods, especially imported
food and certain spare parts that are essential for the industry. So, it is
very much like the past Iraq war period where the government priority was
basically to have enough foreign currency to buy what is essential. But then,
of course, that means you have a very strong austerity economy for consumer
goods, and they generally hurt the public.
Of course, during that war
people were willing to go along since this was a serious threat to national
security. But the present situation is somewhat different. I am not sure if the
same political support for the government that existed when Iraq invaded Iran
exists now. So, the government is thinking in terms of sort of war economy, but
war economy works only when you have public support. And public support exists
when people feel that there is a legitimate reason for national emergency. In
the present situation many believe that Ahmadinejad’s
policies have got Iran in this mess and that if they had a government with a
much different policy there would be no such crisis.
It appears that
this situation has created conflict within the leadership in Iran. There is a
lot of blame going around among various factions, most of which is against Ahmadinejad and his policies. I don’t know if you read the
recent interview with Rafsanjani. It seems that they are bringing him back to
the stage — or he himself is taking advantage of the situation as the so-called
“leader of reconstruction” in the past decades — to present him as the “savior.” In that interview, he talks about the formation of
a kind of “national unity government,” supposedly under his leadership, as the
solution to the crisis. How do you see Rafsanjani’s
return to the center stage at the time when two of
his children were just imprisoned and he himself is constantly under attack by
the Ahmadinejad faction?
I think, from the Iranian
leadership’s point of view, Rafsanjani’s policy would
be the solution to the present situation. Especially if Obama is elected in
November, it would make sense for Iran to be able to negotiate with the United
States. That could help relieve the sanctions and hence relieve the pressure on
the economy. So, the Rafsanjani policy is considered a solution….
What Rafsanjani
policy are you referring to?
His policy would be
basically to come to some agreement with the United States over enrichment and
the nuclear standoff. And this is something that the Larijani
brothers and the previous negotiators would favor.
But you don’t necessarily need to have Rafsanjani to carry out the Rafsanjani
policy. It could be other conservatives, people like the Larijanis
or others, whom the Supreme Leader could appoint to do that.
In the past the Supreme
Leader said that Iran could not negotiate with the United States. That was a
no-no! But that no-no has already ended. When Ahmadinejad
was willing to negotiate directly with the United States, it was clearly with
the consent of the Supreme Leader. So I don’t think that taboo is any longer
there. The future president, whoever it may be, could very much follow a
Rafsanjani type of line without bringing in Rafsanjani himself.
But wasn’t
Rafsanjani, during his active period in Iranian politics — of course he has
always been active behind the scene — a symbol of pro-West, IMF privatizations
in the country? Wouldn’t the re-appearance of Rafsanjani, or a Rafsanjani type
of policy, on the Iranian scene be a step backward for the Iranian economy and
the problems that people are facing?
Privatization is a separate
issue. The foremost thing is the question of enrichment and the nuclear
standoff with the United States. This is the most important issue. As to
privatizations, Ahmadinejad has been pursuing the
same policy. In the absence of a real, popular alternative, all others are
going to be either conservatives or populists like Ahmadinejad.
They are all pursuing the same basic policy of privatization and other
capitalist economic policies.
But, in a critical
situation like this where the country is being threatened, the really important
issue at present is coming to a settlement with the United States over the
nuclear issue. Here, I think, even Ahmadinejad seems
to be willing to do that. But because of his baggage and all the things he has
said in the past eight years, he is not going to have the ability to negotiate
with the United States. But someone with a Rafsanjani perspective, or Khatami perspective, would be able to deal with Obama.
So, do you think
they are going to ditch Ahmadinejad? Given the
tremendous magnitude of the economic pressure, don’t they need to do something
quickly? What do you think will happen between now and the next presidential
election in Iran?
I don’t think they have to
ditch Ahmadinejad. His term extends beyond the
transfer of power in Washington. If Obama is re-elected in November, it would
make sense for Khamenei to appoint a negotiator that
would be able to negotiate directly with the United States as soon as possible
after November. A few months ago, U.S. and Iran came pretty close to making a
settlement on the nuclear issue. That could still be picked up and something
could be delivered. In fact, few months ago Iran was already willing to
compromise, but it was the Obama Administration that could not compromise
because of Israel. But after the election, Obama would be more in charge to be
able to make a deal. Then, he would not have to worry about electoral politics
and being denounced as “appeaser” and so on in the American election.
So, I think it would have
to be someone who directly represents the Supreme Leader, and not someone
associated so much with Ahmadinejad talking about the
Holocaust and his baggage, that Ahmadinejad brought
to the table.
As you said, any
policy aimed at solving the problem will need to have people’s support. With
the austerity plan already in place, and with the emerging mass protests
against economic conditions, what is going to happen inside Iran while the
political process of finding an alternative to Ahmadinejad
and his policies is unfolding?
There will be a period
between the American election in November and the presidential elections in
Iran. In that period I think the pressure on the Iranian economy could be
reduced. So, by the time the Iranian presidential election occurs, this
explosive economic crisis may not be there.
But it seems that
the U.S. is refusing to lift the sanctions unless Iran fully submits to its
demands, and even then, not all of the sanctions are going to be removed.
As I said, the most urgent
issue is the current critical situation and its impact on the future of the
country. Overcoming this urgent crisis requires a solution to the nuclear
standoff with the United States. Obama’s response is presently influenced by
the US presidential elections. But once Obama is re-elected, the difference
between his position and Israel on how stringent their demands are will become
clearer. Obama seems to be willing to accept having some amount of enrichment.
His demand is not stopping the enrichment totally. With that sort of position
Iran will be able to negotiate. During the election, when the American
president is being pressured by Romney and Israel to be as tough as possible,
they cannot come to the table and say Iran can have some enrichment. So they
are saying that we cannot remove sanctions until Iran stops all enrichment
gives us guarantees that it will not enrich in the future. This, of course, is
unacceptable for Iran.
However, after the
election, I think the Obama Administration would be much more flexible and
would say that Iran could have some level of enrichment but with some oversight
— which already exists and wouldn’t be a major concession to Iran. In fact, the
presidential debate made the difference between the Obama Administration and
the future Romney Administration very clear. The Obama Administration’s
position is that under no condition Iran can have a bomb. Romney’s position is
that under no condition Iran can have the capacity to make a bomb. This
is a very important difference….
This is the Israeli
position too….
Yes, the Israeli position
also is that under no condition Iran should have the capacity to make
a bomb.
It seems that one
way or another Iran is going to be stepping back and making concessions. Rafsanjani’s policy, which seems to have been responsible
for the rift between him and the Revolutionary Guards leadership during the
past decade, was to leave the enrichment process to foreign countries and
import the enriched uranium from abroad. If this policy were adopted as a
compromise, wouldn’t it make Iran’s nuclear energy hostage to Western powers?
I don’t think it will make
a big difference because, in the past, Iranian position has been that they were
willing to enrich under supervision and control. So, this is already a sort of
hostage situation. I think it is more about the question of levels of
supervision and control. Khamenei has always accepted
that there would be some restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichment.
You mentioned the issue
of the lack of a real, popular alternative. Rafsanjani is now calling for a
“national unity government.” Do you think this is possible at all at this late
stage, given the existing pressures and factional divisions? How do you see the
current factional arrangements? Who is siding with whom and against whom at
this stage?
I am not sure what
Rafsanjani exactly means by a “national unity government.” But in a crisis like
this you do need to have national consensus.
Under the present
conditions, you can’t have only one faction within the ruling circle to lead an
advance its own exclusive policy. You really need to have a coalition
government in which the Green Movement has representation so that whatever
agreement is reached with regard to both foreign and internal policy, it has
everyone participating in it.
This is where I think you
need a very different thing from Ahmadinejad’s
policy, which has been very exclusive during the past years — there is only one
line and anyone who doesn’t follow it is basically marginalized.
Therefore, Rafsanjani, or
anyone else, would need to have a much more unified government where everyone
is participating.
So, do you see the
freedom of the reform movement as a precondition for achieving this national
unity in the leadership of the country?
Definitely. If you want to
have everyone participating and having a role in the settlement, or even in a
national concession, there has to be much more relaxation on the reform
movement. There has to be much more opening up, like freedom of the
press, expression and assembly, and freedom of political prisoners, so people
feel that they are part of the political process. Now, of course, when there is
an opening up there will always be people who will criticize or denounce any
policy that the government makes. But they could live with that if there is
enough public support for it. I think there is now enough public support for a
settlement on the nuclear issue.
Do you think the
leadership of the Islamic Republic is now moving in the direction of political
openness, or is moving toward a more repressive internal policy and unilateral
handling of the nuclear issue without any input from the public?
If Khamenei
basically moves more to the right and becomes more repressive, while at the
same time becoming also more intransigent and unwilling to meet Obama half way
— if Obama agrees to Iran having enrichment but not to a high level — if that
happens, then I think the regime will be serious crisis. For the first time in
over thirty years, I would say, the regime would be in danger of basically unraveling.
From the very beginning,
the more pragmatic politicians like Rafsanjani and Khatami
argued that you really don’t want to escalate the nuclear issue to the point
that there will be heavy sanctions. Ahmadinejad’s
position was that no, the U.S. will never take us to the UN and get the
sanctions. And when the U.S. tried to do that, he argued that the Europeans
will stop it. And when the Europeans didn’t, he then said we can rely on the
“third-world” countries to stop it. But, of course, he simply didn’t realize
that the “third-world” countries do not have a veto power.
And in the process, he
actually antagonized the Europeans more than Iran had ever done. So, some of
the European countries like Germany and France are now actually more militant
against Iran than the United States. So he has done almost the impossible
thing: alienating the Europeans more than the Americans!
Given the present
critical situation and need for political openness as solution, as a step
toward coming to a national consensus or agreement on the policy, it seems that
Iran is at an important turning point. What, in your view, can or should the
Green Movement do at this stage to at least push the direction of the internal
situation toward a more open society and a more united leadership? What would
be a proper response by the Green Movement at this time? What steps should the
Green Movement take at this stage?
Internally, I think the
Green Movement should insist on opening up the system, especially on less
censorship of the press, on freedom of expression and assembly, and on freedom
of political prisoners. But in foreign policy, the Green Movement shouldn’t try
to criticize any negotiations. Clearly it is in Iran’s interest to come to a
nuclear settlement. To criticize any negotiation as a sell-out is beyond Iran’s
national interests. I am sure that the Green Movement will not be tempted to do
that, but some conservatives may be. Doing so may win some popular support for
a while, but in the long run it would be disastrous for the country.
Do you have any
suggestions for specific tactics on the part of the Green Movement? How should
they enter the scene right now, given the fact that Rafsanjani is entering the
scene from his own angle? How can the Green Movement create pressure from below
to facilitate a pro-people solution?
The main focus of the Green Movement should be on mobilizing its social base and strengthening it. Especially under the present unbearable economic pressures on the people, supporting and advocating people’s economic demands must ben given priority. At the same time, pressure should be put on people like Rafsanjani to support much more the idea of opening up the political process, and especially the freedom of expression and the press. I don’t think Rafsanjani would be against that. One reason: his own daughter has become so prominent as she is still serves time prison. This can be a bridge towards the reform movement.
Given your vast
research on the history of Iranian social movements in the past, can you give
us some historical examples of how, in similar situations in the history of
Iran, people have used proper tactics to advance the cause of national and
popular interests?
In the past, we have had
major crises where there has been an opening up of the system, for example
during the Mossadeq period and the Constitutional
Revolution. In such situations political parties do have an impact, sometimes
negative. The danger is in people trying to out-radical everyone else, saying
they are more nationalistic or more radical than everyone else; and that those
who are making the decisions are selling-out or betraying the national
interests. That is an easy way of trying to out-do everyone else. On the
national level, at the time when the present crisis on the nuclear issue is
very serious, such an approach can be counterproductive.
Going
back to the oil crisis, people who accused Mossadeq
of not being militant enough and being willing to sell out Iran’s interests,
which was not true, in fact undermined Mossadeq’s
government which eventually led to a coup. It would have been much more logical to
continue supporting Mossadeq’s policies because they
represented Iran’s national interests.
In the present situation,
too, it is in the interests of the country to have enrichment, but not
necessarily high enrichment to the level that it is going to create a
confrontation with the Western powers.
I assume you been following the “Campaign for Peace and Freedom” which was recently formed in Iran. What do you think of this kind of campaign?
I think that this would be
something that any unity government must take seriously. You can’t really talk
of unity if you are smothering a huge proportion of the public, the whole
reform movement. People who think they were cheated out of the presidential
elections must be brought back into the whole political arena.
So what is your
general prediction for Iran in the immediate future?
I think a lot hinges on the
American elections. In the last few months, the problem with coming to an
agreement on the nuclear issue has really been in Washington rather than in
Tehran. So I think so much of Iran’s future already depends on what will happen
in the U.S. elections.
With everything
depending on the U.S. elections, what do you think will happen if Romney is
elected?
Probably there will be no negotiations because he will demand that Iran has to stop all enrichment. And of course Iran is not willing to do that. Then the next step for him would be to decide whether he is going to attack Iran militarily. And this will be disastrous.
The rational policy from
the U.S. point of view would be to negotiate. The Obama Administration has realized that and is now waiting for an opportunity
to do it after the election.
If Romney gets elected, I
still think that he will not attack Iran but will continue with even worse
sanctions; and that will create an even worse crisis in Iran. In that case, you
will have a situation in Iran in which there will be basically a complete
suppression and the establishment of total dictatorship to control the state,
because there will be popular uprising. Then the only way the regime could
survive would be to turn to its military and security forces.
Would Israel be
emboldened to attack Iran if Romney is elected?
They would be, but I don’t
think that would solve the problem. Clearly Israel does not have the capability
of actually removing all the nuclear installations. So, that will not solve the
nuclear issue either. It would only put back Iran’s nuclear program. The only
way they could cause real damage is if there is a U.S. military intervention.
Don’t you think
that an Israeli military attack will drag the United States, willingly or
unwillingly, into a military confrontation with Iran?
Possibly,
but not necessarily, because even the second Bush Administration, after the
Iraqi fiasco, basically told Israel that the U.S. is not going to get involved
militarily.
Romney could choose to pursue basically the same Bush policy.
Thank you, Dr. Abarahmian.
Quelle: http://karzar.org/English/?p=1302